

SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP79M00097A000100030002-7

S-2136/PL-1

DIAPL-3

26 October 1970

DIAPL-1

Comments on the DASD(I) Paper on the Blue Ribbon Panel

1. The BRDP did the first comprehensive study of military intelligence since the Kirkpatrick study in 1960. The BRDP study, with its shotgun approach, is simply not of the same caliber as the earlier study in that it does not focus attention on the main deficiency in Defense intelligence; namely, resource allocation. Actually, intelligence operations are quite efficient; but the same cannot be said for DOD's ability to manage intelligence resources. Presently, Defense intelligence is over-compartmentalized into semi-autonomous agencies/programs - each with an insatiable appetite for resources. As presently organized, the DOD is not capable of putting these competing resource demands into a total DOD perspective, or to develop a good appreciation of the overall DOD intelligence posture. Without this kind of cross-program visibility, SecDef finds it extremely difficult to decide on intelligence resource levels and to make trade-offs. Hence, he approves separate programs that have not been assessed as a single package. This dilemma is especially noticeable with respect to collection resources. The reason the DOD cannot deal effectively with the resource allocation problem is because there is no single office with enough authority and size to reach across the various compartments and to make visible the whole picture regarding the allocation of DOD intelligence resources and to assess the future resource needs of the entire Department of Defense.

2. To their credit, the BRDP did propose an intelligence organization which would enable SecDef to deal more effectively with the resource management problem mentioned above. The strengthening of the DASD(I) office and the consolidation of collection under one head would be important organizational improvements.

3. DASD(I)'s "Alternatives" paper, by listing too many pro's and con's, fails to make clear the main advantages and disadvantages of each alternative. For example, a big advantage of Alternatives 1 and 4 is that they would enable the DOD to break through the barriers which now separate the collection agencies and to weigh collection resources as an entity.

DIA review(s) completed.

Approved For Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP79M00097A000100030002-7

GROUP 3

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 09-10-2013 pursuant to E.O. 13526


SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP79M00097A000100030002-7

4. I do not share the fears of many of my colleagues that Alternatives 1 and 4 would result in collection being dominated by NSA, or that the Collection Agency (DIOA) would automatically dominate the Production Agency (DIPA). The DIOA may be dominated by COMINT types for a time, especially if it were set up at NSA Headquarters. But since the head of DIOA would be responsible for all collection, he would soon recognize that COMINT is but one of several means for collecting information -- and that photography, in the 1970's, will be at least as important as COMINT. Moreover, the ASD(I) should make it his business to assure that the DIOA did not dominate the DIPA. This would be done by giving definite responsibilities and authority to the DIPA -- and sufficient rank to its Chief.

5. With respect to Annex F, DIAPL-1 concurs that the new ASD(I) should be strengthened generally along the lines provided for in the concept paper. The experience of the last year has been that the DASD(I) staff simply did not exert the authority or have enough people to enable it to coordinate the military intelligence activities. We should insure, however, that the DASD(I) staff sticks to the role of general coordinator and stays out of the details and the day-to-day matters which are properly the purview of the operating agencies.

  
Colonel, USA  
Chief, DIAPL-1

25X1DIA

Approved For Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP79M00097A000100030002-7

SECRET